T h e H u m a n G e n o m e P r o j e c t ( H G P ) is a w o r l dwide effort to map and sequence all of the 100,000 or so genes that are found in the 47 chromosomes of human beings. Each gene comprises a sequence of four chemicals called nucleotides. These link together to form long, complex molecules of deoxyribonucleic acid, commonly known as DNA. The totality of genetic information in each organism is called its genome. To map the human genome means to locate each gene on a particular chromosome. To sequence the human genome means to determine the order in which the four nucleotides are arranged in each gene.
understanding of genetic variation and disease, and has the potential to make available an increased number of genetic tests for screening and diagnosis of diseases, as well as other biological characteristics of hu mans.
Recognizing that the H G P raises fundamental issues of bioethics (Annas 1992) , the U.S. Congress designated from 3 to 5 percent of the three billion dollars originally allotted to human genome research for studies of the ethical, legal, and social implications (ELSI) of the project and created a working group for this task (Roberts 1993) . A novel aspect of the H G P is that it studies these issues alongside the scientific ones in the hope that problems can be anticipated and policy options developed. Three principal areas have been identified for initial study: privacy and confidentiality of genetic information; protection from dis crimination based on genetics; and safe introduction of genetic tests into mainstream medical practice (Collins and Galas 1993) .
A lthough all of these issues are relevant to individuals, families, and society at large, women, because of their central role in reproduction and caregiving, are affected not only differently but also more significantly than men by the information emerging from the HGP. Nonetheless, women have seldom been the focus of studies emerging from the ELSI program of the National Center for H um an Genome Research. Accord ingly, the goal of this article is to document the distinct impact of "the new genetics" on women. By identifying gender differences not only in research and clinical practice, but also in the psychosocial, legal, and ethical implications of the HGP, we hope both to evoke and to inform public discussion and policies that may be generated by these issues.
A Typology of Gender Differences
Women are recipients of genetic services not only in their capacity as patients, but also as participants in prenatal diagnosis, treatment, re search, and, frequently, as primary caregivers of those affected with genetic conditions. Women also predominate among health care pro viders for those who utilize genetic services; their predominance, how ever, is limited to those areas of health care that are held in less regard and are less remunerative than others (Weaver 1978) . For example, only one-third of doctorally prepared medical geneticists are women, but 94 percent of masters-prepared genetic counselors are women (Wertz and Fletcher 1988a; Pencarinha et al. 1992) .
The difference between male and female roles in reproduction ac counts for the predominance of women as recipients of genetic services even when they are not personally affected by genetic conditions. Be cause some diseases are treatable in utero, pregnant women already undergo treatm ent for the sake of their fetuses. As gene therapies de velop, they may be encouraged even more to participate in therapies for the sake of their offspring.
Political and social pressures are sometimes brought to bear on women who are carriers of genetic diseases, particularly those women who do not have independent financial resources to care for affected children. Such women may be challenged about becoming pregnant or criticized for continuing a pregnancy after prenatal diagnosis confirms the pres ence of fetal abnormality or genetic condition (Purdy 1978) . Conversely, the ongoing controversy over abortion m ight lead to increased social criticism of women who wish to terminate affected pregnancies. Busi nesses may lim it options of women in the workplace, and insurance companies may curtail their access to coverage based on genetic knowl edge relevant to womens reproductive capacities. Admittedly, discrimi natory practices affect men as well. In the past, however, discrimination based on reproductive capacity has mainly affected women (Annas 1991; Gostin 1991) .
In spite of the unique ways in which women are differently affected, gender-neutral terminology continues to dominate considerations of ethi cal issues related to the HGP, even in discussions directly related to reproduction (Mahowald 1994; Watson 1990) . It is crucial, however, to consider gender differences in order to formulate ethically justifiable clinical and policy decisions about reproduction and genetics. Such jus tification is usually linked w ith considerations of "justice" or "equality."
The concepts of "justice" and "equality" are often construed as re quiring that all individuals be treated in the same way (Mahowald 1993) . However, because men and women occupy empirically distinct roles, it is neither possible nor desirable to treat them in the same way with regard to reproduction, prenatal testing and diagnosis, and deci sions about the continuation or term ination of pregnancy. The differ ences that men and women embody as gendered individuals can be recognized and addressed w ithout im puting inferiority to one or the other on that basis (Mahowald 1994) . Gender differences as such do not necessitate inequality or injustice toward members of either sex.
Five Questions Based on Gender
To facilitate examination of ethical issues raised by gender differences in genetics, it is necessary to identify the differences that arise in research, the clinical applications of that research, and the nonmedical aspects of peoples lives that are or may be affected by advances in genetics. This article addresses five empirical questions as a guide in that determina tion: Studies addressing these issues were reviewed and summarized. Because of the breadth of the questions asked and the limitations of the available literature, our discussion of these issues cannot be regarded as conclusive or complete. By organizing a vast amount of material around a focus on women, however, we provide both an argument and an agenda for future empirical studies and ethical analyses of considerations that are particu larly relevant to women in the new genetics.
Genetic Conditions in Women
Genetic conditions may be distinguished by their modes of inheritance; these include chromosomal, autosomal dominant, autosomal recessive, and X-linked recessive conditions (Jones 1989) . Genetic conditions may also be distinguished by their different manifestations, which in clude physical impairments, mental retardation, chronic medical prob lems, reduced life span, and early or late onset of progressive symptoms. The same condition may fit into m ultiple categories (Jablonski 1991; McKusick 1992; Tierney et al. 1993) . The genetic conditions associated with gender differences include: those affecting primarily one sex or affecting the sexes in unequal ratios; those determined by the sex of the transm itting parent; those affecting fertility differently in males and females; and those in which pregnancy poses risks to affected women or their fetuses. In table 1, we offer illustrations of how genetic diseases may have different physical effects and may be experienced differently by women than by men. For example, women transm it X-linked reces sive conditions to their sons but not to their daughters (Laxova and Feldman 1992) . W omen w ith cystic fibrosis are fertile, whereas men are usually not; pregnancy, however, poses particular health risks to affected women (Canny, Corey, and Livingstone 1991) . The im pact of gender-specific diseases is influenced by gender-based societal influences. Breast cancer, for example, is a disease whose impact is exacerbated in women because of social factors. Beyond its high in cidence in women (one in eight, in contrast to its extremely low inci dence in men), the extant treatm ent modalities of mastectomy and chemotherapy are generally disfiguring in ways that men treated simi larly do not find as burdensome because society is less likely to attach importance to them for men. H air loss, even though temporary, is em barrassing and sometimes hum iliating for women, mainly because they are not expected to be bald; and breast removal entails for many the permanent loss of their womanly appearance. Prophylactic mastecto mies for some patients who have a family history of the disease are particularly onerous because the disfigurement may not actually entail a compensating benefit.
Treatment of certain forms of gynecological cancer for which suscep tibility tests are or will eventually be available may result in loss of the ability to conceive or bear a child. Men, of course, may be rendered 
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sterile through cancer treatm ent as well, but treatm ent of male infer tility is often accomplished through womens bodies rather than through mens. Although men can store their sperm prior to treatment, no com parable option is currently available to women. Moreover, the fact that women can lose both their gestational and their genetic capability to have children may be viewed as doubling their potential losses.
W om en I n v o lv e d in H u m a n G en om e R esearch
As outlined by Jordan (1992) , the specific goals of the H G P are the following:
1. mapping and sequencing the human genome and the genomes of model organisms 2. research training 3. technology development and transfer 4. examination of ethical, legal, and social issues associated with the H G P All of these goals appear gender neutral, neither disproportionately involving nor affecting one gender more than the other ( Jordan 1992; National Institutes of H ealth 1990) . The genome to be sequenced is a composite of sequences from various sources, most from existing cell lines of healthy individuals of both sexes. DNA regions of particular interest (i.e., the genes involved in specific genetic conditions) are se quenced from many individuals of both sexes during the course of the research (N ational Institutes of Health 1990). H G P researchers have targeted diseases that are symptomatic in each sex, such as X-linked diseases in men and breast cancer in women (National Institutes of Health 1990). Although the National Center for H um an Genome Re search does not keep a summary of the number of men and women who are trained in skills necessary to complete the HGP, the numbers of men and women receiving grant awards have reflected the same proportion as those applying: approximately 23 percent are female (Muller 1992; Anderson 1992) . In a 1995 estimate of grants and contracts awarded since the beginning of the ELSI program of the National Center for Human Genome Research, 48 of 103 proposals list women as their principal investigators and at least 12 projects explicitly consider the implications of the H G P for women (Elizabeth J. Thomson, Acting Director of ELSI program: personal communication, December 21,1995) . Several additional projects focus on the role of genetic counselors and nurses, the majority of whom are women. W hile it may be argued that the nature of the information generated by the H G P requires greater attention to and consideration of gender-related issues, the funding of these proposals does demonstrate an awareness on the part of the ELSI working group of the importance of addressing the ways in which ge netic information specifically affects women.
Because the goals of the H G P involve mapping and sequencing the human genome, and not detection of genetic diseases, the research itself does not differentially affect women. However, differential impact may occur w ith the use of the information generated by the HGP. Consid eration of the ethical, legal, and social implications of the availability or generation of increased genetic information necessarily addresses ad vances in preconception screening, prenatal testing, and prenatal thera pies for different genetic conditions (table 2) . Additional studies are needed to determine the impact of this information on women in the context of their personal and social roles (table 3) . The information derived from the HGP, such as the development of new or improved procedures for preconception screening, prenatal diagnosis, and prenatal therapies, will have a profound effect on decisions about reproduction and, therefore, on women s lives. Although the impact of such decisions on men cannot be discounted, the central role of women in reproduction and the direct impact of reproductive decisions on wom en's bodies point to a greater and more immediate effect. This differ ential impact has led to the enactment of laws that perm it women alone to make decisions regarding initiation, termination, and continuation of pregnancy.
Reproductive technologies like prenatal testing are not gender neu tral in societies where profound gender differences exist, particularly in societies where women are disadvantaged economically and socially and are thus more vulnerable or powerless (Lippman 1991a) . Further, women are frequently expected, and sometimes required, to fulfill norms and expectations regarding pregnancy and motherhood, including the re sponsibility for caregiving and children's health (King 1994; Lippman 1992) . Determining the impact of genetic information on women calls for an examination of the variety of prenatal genetic services currently available to them, along w ith the risks, burdens, and benefits associated with these services. It also calls for a determination of which women have access to prenatal genetic services, including abortion, and of the psychological impact of genetic counseling, testing, and termination of affected pregnancies. Currently, a number of different procedures are available for detecting chromosomal abnormalities and other genetic conditions in utero (Verp, Simpson, and Ober 1993) . These diagnostic procedures differ in their invasiveness, cost, accuracy, potential risks, and optimal time of perfor mance. A brief description of each of the currently available prenatal diagnostic procedures is presented in table 4.
Prenatal treatm ent of fetal abnormalities is relatively new, and there are no known cures or treatments for the majority of conditions that can be diagnosed in utero (Elias and Annas 1992) . Some recently developed or experimental prenatal therapies for fetal abnormalities are described in table 5. In general, however, pregnancy termination remains the only means for avoiding the birth of a child whose genetic anomaly has been discovered through prenatal testing. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis, described in table 4, is a means of avoiding pregnancy termination after diagnosis of an affected fetus, but this option is unlikely to be available to most because it generally requires in vitro fertilization, a costly pro cedure w ith a lim ited success rate (Carson and Buster 1994) .
As information generated by the H G P escalates, the gap between our understanding of genetic diseases and effective treatment of these dis eases has tended to increase rather than to narrow (Friedmann 1990) . Further research into the development of gene therapies and other treat ment modalities may alter this scenario. It cannot be denied, however, that the prenatal diagnostic procedures and therapies described in tables 4 and 5 offer benefits to many women and couples. For example, pre natal diagnosis provides im portant information to those who wish to avoid the birth of an offspring w ith a specific genetic condition. For women who do not choose to terminate affected pregnancies, advance knowledge in order to prepare psychologically, medically, and finan cially for the birth of an affected child has been viewed as desirable. Nonetheless, the burdens of prenatal diagnosis and therapy include physical risks to the fetus, to the woman carrying the pregnancy, or to both.
A lthough such medical risks are directly experienced by women but not men, the economic and emotional burdens may affect both partners. No data are available regarding the distinct financial and psychological M a r y B . M a h o w a ld et al. 
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o a j burden of prenatal tests on men. Because insurance coverage for such procedures is not universal (Nsiah-Jefferson and Hall 1989), however, the financial burden of prenatal diagnosis and therapy may fall on women with greater frequency than on their partners, depending on their in surance status and their partners involvement. Similarly, the emotional burden of prenatal testing and decisions is different for women than for men. Studies suggest that the psychological burden of undergoing such procedures is great, even when, as is commonly the case, the results are normal (Rothm an 1994).
Although new reproductive technologies may benefit some individu als and couples, the impact on women in general is a mixed picture (Nsiah-Jefferson 1994). In the context of a profoundly inequitable health care system, it is not surprising that some advocates for low-income women and women of color view new reproductive technologies with suspicion (Nsiah-Jefferson and Hall 1989), or that feminist critics con sider the latest technologies as part of a larger history of womens loss of control over birth and the overuse of technology associated with it (Wertz and W ertz 1989; W ertz and Fletcher 1993) . Some feminists and advocates for people w ith disabilities have argued that women are co erced into accepting prenatal diagnoses by social and cultural forces and by a medical system that follows the "technological imperative" of using prenatal diagnosis simply because it exists (Andrews 1987; Wertz and Fletcher 1993; Nsiah-Jefferson 1994) . Despite the fact that women with lower incomes currently have less access to prenatal diagnosis than other women, there has been concern that pressure may intensify to require women w ithout the resources for raising a disabled child to undergo prenatal diagnosis and to have an abortion if the child tests positive for a genetic condition (Nsiah-Jefferson 1994) . Those most likely to lack such resources are m inority women, many of whom are also single m oth ers (Andrews 1987; Bianchi and Spain 1987; Lippman 1991a) .
Controversy surrounds the issue of whether prenatal testing and di agnosis is inherently beneficial or burdensome to women. It has been argued that women seek the options afforded by prenatal diagnosis, and exercise more power over their reproductive choices through prenatal diagnosis than through any other technologies associated with birth (Rapp 1990 (Rapp , 1991 . But, as already suggested, many explicit and im plicit pressures influence the decisions of women following the prenatal diagnosis of an affected pregnancy. The potential pressures include fi nancial considerations, such as the loss of insurance or employment, and social stigmas surrounding illness or disabilities (Billings et al. 1992; Gostin 1991; Lippman 1991a; Nsiah-Jefferson and Hall 1989; Wertz and Fletcher 1993) .
Ideally, prenatal testing and diagnosis should be offered after the woman or the couple has undergone genetic counseling, in which the primary nondirective goal is to help individuals and couples achieve their personally defined wishes (Wertz and Fletcher 1988a) . However, the very offer of prenatal diagnosis by an obstetrician may be interpreted as a recommendation to accept testing, making it difficult for women to reject these medically sanctioned technologies (Clarke 1991; Gallagher 1989; Gates 1994; Henifin, Hubbard, and Norsigian 1989; Wertz and Fletcher 1993) . Such pressures are most likely to be exerted in a climate where concerns about "fetal rights'7 and "prenatal abuse'7 are viewed as overriding the right of pregnant women to autonomous decisions about their lifestyle and medical treatment. Nonetheless, the fact that some women have refused prenatal diagnosis on moral grounds, even when tests are offered w ithout charge through national or state health care systems, suggests that many women do exercise their autonomy. Women who have allegedly been "deprived of choice" have sued physicians on the grounds of "wrongful birth," stating that physicians failed to inform them of the availability of genetic testing and of their risks of giving birth to children w ith genetic defects (Andrews 1992) .
The availability of prenatal genetic testing has increased third-party involvement in individual women's reproductive decision-making by family members, physicians, insurance agencies, and society (Gates 1994) . This again raises concerns about possible constraints on women's au tonomy. Research on agreement between men and women about the purposes of genetic services demonstrates that a substantial number of couples come to genetic counseling and testing for different reasons and with different reproductive plans. Disagreement between partners has not been diminished by genetic counseling (Sorenson and Wertz 1986) . In light of the more significant burden of the decision on women, however, laws or policies affirm women's autonomy as paramount in situations of unresolvable conflict.
Contrasting views about the inherent value of prenatal diagnosis and testing may be influenced by the fact that the benefits and burdens are distributed most unevenly among women themselves. This maldistri bution reflects social inequality and disparities in access to health care services in general (Nsiah-Jefferson 1994) . Low-income women might be pressured to abort because of perceived economic burdens on society of their disabled child (Lippman 1991a) , but low-income women m ight also be denied full access to genetic technologies, leading to a dispro portionate number of people w ith special needs from poor populations (Nsiah-Jefferson 1994) .
Since amniocentesis first became available, utilization of prenatal diagnostic procedures by women has been strongly associated with so cioeconomic status and education (Cowan 1993; Smith and Miller 1990; Lippman 1991a; Marion et al. 1980; Wertz and Fletcher 1993) . Access to prenatal diagnosis is affected by access to general health care. Many low-income women are unable to avail themselves of prenatal testing because they begin prenatal care too late or receive none at all (NsiahJefferson 1989; Wertz and Fletcher 1993) . Low-income women must also depend on government funding of prenatal procedures because they lack medical coverage through employment-based insurance programs or cannot pay for these services privately. Medicaid provides funding for prenatal diagnosis procedures like amniocentesis or chorionic villus sam pling, but reimbursement varies by state, with enormous gaps reported between reimbursements and charges. In essence, then, there is no guar antee of coverage (Nsiah-Jefferson 1994) .
Access to abortion is also restricted for poor women. Medicaid fully supports the costs of abortion in 13 states; the other states fund abor tions through Medicaid only in cases where the m others life is in danger or the pregnancy results from rape or incest (Daley and Benson-Gold 1993) . Access to sites for late abortions (those that occur after the first trimester, which is generally after prenatal diagnosis confirms the pres ence of a genetic anomaly) is even more restricted, and the financial costs more prohibitive (Nsiah-Jefferson 1994) . Although some states fund abortions after the diagnosis of "severe" disability in the fetus, there is wide variability from state to state on what is considered a "severe defect" (Charo and Rothenberg 1994) . W ithout equal access to abortion services, the autonomy of low-income women to make repro ductive decisions is compromised (Charo and Rothenberg 1994) .
Interestingly, socioeconomic disparity in the use of prenatal diagnosis also exists in Canada, where there is no direct charge for testing (LippmanHand 1981; . O ther barriers to use of prenatal diagnostic services by women of lower socioeconomic status arise in communication difficulties between medical professionals and patients with less education, long waiting periods for services (which lim it the practicality of utilizing prenatal procedures), uneven geographic distri bution of prenatal service sites, and lack of funding for abortions to terminate affected pregnancies (Curry 1989; Nsiah-Jefferson and Hall 1989; Rapp 1994; Smith and Miller 1990; Wertz and Fletcher 1993) .
The cultural values of specific ethnic groups play a role in their acceptance of, and interest in, prenatal testing and diagnosis (Rapp 1994) . It has long been noted that white, middle-class patients are much more likely to undergo testing than poorer women from ethnic and racial minorities. This difference is probably influenced by dispari ties in access, familiarity with scientific and genetic information, atti tudes toward the local health care establishments, and individual reproductive and life histories (Rapp 1994) . Further, prenatal testing and diagnosis may seem pointless to women who would not terminate a pregnancy for cultural or religious reasons, or who have no access to funding for abortions if they should decide to terminate an affected pregnancy. Nonetheless, several studies have examined the acceptance of prenatal testing by low-income minority women and found that they are receptive to genetic services despite such influences or obstacles (Kassam et al. 1980; Marion et al. 1980; Rapp 1994) . The acceptance by these women of reproductive technology suggests that they are not using prenatal diagnosis to make decisions regarding pregnancy termi nation, but rather to gain increased information about their children for personal or culturally mediated purposes (Rapp 1988 (Rapp , 1990 .
For the many reasons listed above, prenatal screening and diagnosis appears much less likely to contribute to the reproductive choices of low-income women or women of color than other women. African Ameri cans and Hispanics account for a greater proportion of births to women over 40 years of age (Wertz and Fletcher 1993) . Because advanced ma ternal age is a strong risk factor for birth of children with genetic anomalies, genetic services may not be available to, or utilized by, the women who have the greatest need of them. As women of higher so cioeconomic status continue to utilize prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion at greater rates, the number of children w ith genetic conditions born to minority and lower-income women potentially increases (NsiahJefferson 1994; Wertz and Fletcher 1993) . At present, the fear that lower-income women or single mothers may be differentially influenced by health professionals to use prenatal diagnosis and to abort affected pregnancies seems unfounded. Women who m ight be criticized for car-lying fetuses w ith genetic anomalies to term because they lack the resources to care for them also generally lack the resources to pay for prenatal diagnosis.
The availability of increased genetic information may confer emo tional or psychological burdens on women through the impact of the information itself and through their experience of prenatal testing and termination of affected pregnancies (Abuelo et al. 1991; Black 1989 Black , 1990 Black , 1994 Caccia et al. 1991; Clarke 1991; Edwards, Rothstein, and Young 1989; Marteau et al. 1992; Rothman 1994) . W om ens widely varying social and psychological experience of prenatal testing and di agnosis has mainly been discussed anecdotally. Little consideration has been given to the experience of the male partner as a separate partici pant. Despite the absence of conclusive data, proponents of testing have presented prenatal testing and diagnosis as a means of giving women increased control over their reproductive choices or reassurance in con tinuing their pregnancies; critics, on the other hand, have explored the implicit pressures that prevent women from exercising authentic choice (Lippman 1991a) .
The possibility of obtaining unrequested information through ge netic testing introduces another potential burden to consider. Occasion ally, the disclosure of m isattributed paternity has been withheld from the husband of a woman whose fetus is affected by a genetic disease. In situations of autosomal recessive disorders for which carrier testing is possible and accurate, W ertz and Fletcher (1988b) report that 94 per cent of medical geneticists believe that protection of the m others con fidentiality overrides disclosure of m isattributed paternity. Pencarinha and her colleagues (1992) found that 98.5 percent of genetic counselors would disclose the information to the mother alone. For both groups, the rationale most often offered for nondisclosure to the husband was preservation of the family unit.
That nondisclosure of m isattributed paternity remains controversial is evident in the discrepant recommendations of the President's Com mission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1983) and the Institute of Medicines Com mittee on Assessing Genetic Risks (Andrews et al. 1994) . The former maintains that counselors have an obligation to both partners as counselees. "Full disclosure," the commissioners wrote, "combined with care ful counseling that goes well beyond information-giving, would seem most likely to fulfill the principles of autonomy and beneficence." In contrast, the Institute of Medicine Committee recommends that infor mation on m isattributed paternity be communicated to the mother, but not volunteered to the womans partner. A lthough the President's Com mission supports nondisclosure if "disclosure would probably result in a serious and irreversible harm ," whether disruption of the family unit would in fact occur and whether such disruption constitutes "serious and irreversible harm " are questions for which empirical evidence is lacking. Thus, while acknowledging that "this extremely sensitive issue is likely to become increasingly problematic as genetic testing ex pands," the Institute of Medicine committee concludes by recommend ing "research and evaluation of current policies and practices in genetic testing and screening related to identification of m isattributed pater nity" (see table 3 ).
Another issue that warrants further study is the weight that women place on having a genetic tie to their children. Among the infertile, some women regret that they do not or cannot experience gestation and childbirth more than they regret the absence of a genetic tie to their offspring. For example, in a study of 50 infertile women in England, the majority (28) said they would prefer to be birth mothers rather than genetic mothers if they could not be both (Thornton, McNamara, and Montague 1994) . Because men can only be related biologically to their offspring through genetics, and not through gestation, they may place greater weight on genetics than women.
Women who choose to undergo prenatal testing procedures like am niocentesis or chorionic villus sampling (see table 4 for a description) tend to be concerned about the possibility of carrying a fetus with a genetic abnormality. Reasons for undergoing prenatal testing include maternal age, previous experience of an abnormal pregnancy or out come, significant family history of genetic disease, and abnormal results on other screening tests like the maternal serum alpha-feto protein (MSAFP) test (see table 4 for a description) (Pryde et al. 1993) . Such women are often particularly anxious about the risks of invasive testing and the possibility of abnormal results (Black 1994) . Interestingly, one recent study suggests that women's perceptions of the increased risk of an abnormal pregnancy exceed the actual risk, and that their apprehen siveness does not diminish through counseling and education (Pryde et al. 1993) . It is unclear that women experience lasting effects of this anxiety when test results indicate no abnormality (Black 1989; Cacciaet al. 1991; Marteau et al. 1992) . Some studies have demonstrated no differences; others have demonstrated less anxiety among those who are tested than those who are not; and some studies have shown elevated anxiety throughout pregnancy even after normal results have been ob tained (Evers-Kiebooms, Sweerts, and Van den Berghe 1988; Gates 1994; Rothman 1994) . Finally, some commentators have suggested that an exclusive focus on "anxiety" as the main emotional burden conferred by prenatal testing and diagnosis leads to other powerful psychological burdens being overlooked (Rothm an 1994) .
After a test result indicates a genetic abnormality, a decision to ter minate a pregnancy can have profound emotional and psychological consequences (Black 1994; Rothm an 1994) . Recent research has at tempted to characterize the experience of elective termination of preg nancy after diagnosis of genetic anomaly for both women and men (Black 1994) . The physical experience of pregnancy loss and the degree and duration of distress were felt to be critical gender differences (Black 1994; Rothman 1994) . A lthough the response varies considerably, many women report profound feelings of grief and loss (Rothman 1994) . Some evidence suggests that women who undergo abortions later in their pregnancies, who have had a number of prior miscarriages, or who have previously had a pregnancy in which the fetus was diagnosed with a genetic condition experience more difficult grief reactions than those whose abortions were not associated w ith these factors (Black 1994) . Women who term inate affected pregnancies after prenatal diagnosis in the second trim ester tend to experience psychological responses similar to those of patients who suffer second trimester miscarriages (Black 1994; Elders and Laurence 1991) . Both experiences generally involve loss of a pregnancy that was both wanted and closely monitored, some times after having had the experience of seeing the fetus through ultra sound pictures, feeling fetal movement, and gaining information on fetal sex and chromosomal constitution (Fletcher and Evans 1983; Black 1989 Black , 1994 Caccia et al. 1991; Rapp 1990; Rothman 1994) . The pro cess of prenatal testing and diagnosis, particularly the visual image of ultrasound, which presents the fetus as a real and separate entity, may actually strengthen the emotional tie between the woman and her fetus (Black 1989 (Black , 1994 Rapp 1990 ).
Black has provided one of the few rigorous empirical studies of the impact and consequences of the new genetic knowledge on reproductive decision-making and the social and psychological well-being of women. Many articles on this topic are reports of individual womens experi ences, which, while interesting and suggestive of future studies, are not conclusive (Rothm an 1986); others are commentaries calling for in creased attention to these issues (Lippman 1991b; Pryde et al. 1993) . The existing studies tend to be lim ited by small sample sizes and un controlled study methodology. Empirical investigations like Blacks are needed to test unproved assumptions about how women cope with and experience these issues (table 3) .
The extent to which genetic information influences womens deci sions on reproduction, including the decision to continue or terminate a pregnancy, is one of the most challenging issues emerging from the HGP. The use of genetic information in clinical practice continues to proliferate, as do the ongoing arguments about whether this will ulti mately constitute a benefit or burden. There is as yet no clear picture of the factors that influence womens choice to undergo prenatal testing and then to terminate or continue an affected pregnancy (Pryde et al. 1993) . It does seem, however, that specific subgroups of women are at increased risk of harm based either on the misuse of genetic information or lack of access to genetic information.
A final concern is the delivery of information on medical genetics to women by individuals who lack training in genetic counseling (Gates 1994) . The H G P is certain to cause an influx of genetic information into mainstream medical practice. Counseling may become more directive and less accurate if provided by medical professionals who are not trained in techniques of genetic counseling (Holtzm an 1993; Sorenson 1993) . Training for primary caregivers and others involved in genetic counsel ing therefore is a critical step toward m inimizing pressures and biases.
Impact of Genetic Information on Womens Employment and Insurance
There is a wealth of information demonstrating that genetic discrimi nation (discrimination based solely on an apparent or perceived varia tion from the "normal" human genotype) already exists, particularly in social institutions like the workplace or in health and life insurance underwriting practices (Billings et al. 1992; Bowman 1991; Gostin 1991; Natowicz, Alper, and Alper 1992) . Although the use of genetic screening, testing, or data is not yet widespread among employers orinsurers, rising employee benefit costs, market forces, and technological availability may create a powerful incentive for it to expand (Gostin 1991) . Beyond issues of health care, womens workforce participation tends to cluster in low-paying, low-prestige occupations where they are already vulnerable to discrimination based on gender (Bielby and Baron 1986) . Broader access to genetic information may thus increase the likelihood of genetic discrimination in the workplace.
Historically, employers have limited women's access to traditionally male-occupied, high-paying positions, often using health concerns as the basis for exclusion (Annas 1991; Norris 1991; Fischer 1987; Burstein 1989) . Recently, employers have substituted concern about fetal health for concern about women's health as an argument for limiting women's job opportunities (Annas 1991; Flaherty 1991; Gostin 1991; Noble 1993; Norris 1991) . In 1991, however, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that federal law prohibits employers from excluding women from job categories on the grounds that they are or might become pregnant. The justices unanimously decided that the "fetal protection policy" adopted by Johnson Controls to restrict jobs in the manufacture of batteries to men and sterile women was a violation of law prohibiting discrimination solely on the basis of possible or actual pregnancy.1
The Johnson Controls case nonetheless demonstrates that women may face discrimination because of their reproductive capacity, regard less of whether they are pregnant or intend to become so. Although male exposure to lead used in battery manufacture might also cause genetic anomalies in fetuses, only women were targeted by this policy. In addition to Johnson Controls, companies like General Motors, Du Pont, Union Carbide, and other major corporations have prohibited fertile women from working in high-level, high-paying jobs involving substantial exposure to lead. Such fetal protection policies have barred women from as many as 20-million jobs (Becker 1986; Norris 1991) .
At present, there are few reports of disease-specific discrimination affecting women. However, the history of disease or other preexisting conditions has often been used as a reason to deny health insurance to many individuals of either sex, and all genetic diseases may be consid ered "preexisting conditions." W hether this is a practice that affects women more often than men, or whether the loss of health insurance is generally more disastrous for women than men, is unclear. The increas ing number of female-headed households suggests that a greater num ber of women are responsible for coverage of affected relatives. More studies are needed to address this issue (see table 3 ).
Information regarding genetic discrimination in employment and insurance includes not only documentation of the practice, but also recommendations for avoiding or reducing such discrimination (Gostin 1991; Billings et al. 1992; Kass 1992; Natowicz et al. 1992; Murray 1992; Ostrer et al. 1993) . Studies indicate that employers are less likely to offer common nonwage benefits like health coverage and disability to women (Currie 1993) . There is, however, little documentation of genderrelated genetic discrimination in employment and insurance, and little court litigation to date has focused on the burden of genetic testing on women (Gostin 1991) . The use of genetic prognosis for employment decisions is generally a gender-neutral and race-neutral policy. Any Title VII litigation to remedy genetic discrimination is likely, therefore, to be based upon "disparate impact theory": the rationale that consideration of genetic traits or conditions in employment decisions disqualifies pro portionately more women (Gostin 1991) . The evidence of previous and current employment discrimination based on gender or reproductive potential supports the claim that the potential harm of rendering hu man beings virtually unemployable through genetic prognosis is likely to fall disproportionately on women.
Women W ho Care fo r the G enetically D isa b led
The economic and social costs of bearing children, whether healthy or dis abled, are greater for women than ever before because of their increased workforce participation (Bianchi and Spain 1987) . Both formally as hired caregivers and informally as unpaid caregivers of family members, friends, and relatives, women are the main providers of care to children, the sick, the disabled, and the elderly (Thompson and Walker 1989 ; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1988; Wertz and Fletcher 1993) . Moreover, the recent rise in divorces and numbers of births to single women has led to a predomi nance of women as sole caregivers of children, w ith or w ithout genetic conditions (Bianchi and Spain 1987) . Few studies have been undertaken on the costs and burdens of caregiving to disabled or chronically ill chil dren, and these may be flawed by poor methodology in survey methods, limited use of variables to explain cost variations, and unstandardized mea sures in assessing the costs of caregiving. However, even these limited results suggest an enormous economic and social burden for family care givers, who are usually women, in caring for disabled or chronically ill children (Jacobs and M cDermott 1989; Marcenko and Meyers 1991; Mc Collum 1971; W ertz and Fletcher 1993) .
Costs of caregiving include both objective and subjective costs, in cluding money expended on therapies, medications, nursing care, hos pital stays and medical equipm ent, as well as stress, time, and chronic fatigue (Breslau 1983; Eiser 1990; Parks and Pilisuk 1991) . The costs of caring for chronically ill and disabled children extends long beyond the period of childrens normal dependence (Jacobs and McDermott 1989; Wertz and Fletcher 1993) . Added to the persistent economic costs is the physical and psychological toll on the part of the primary caregiver, which includes ill health, guilt, and anger (Parks and Pilisuk 1991) . The symptoms of mothers who are primary caregivers are strongly influenced by their perception of how severely disabled their child is, the severity of the child's disability, and their relationship with the child's father (Eiser 1990) . Women who are primary caregivers are more likely to experience depression than their male counterparts (Eiser 1990) .
Studies looking at the impact of a child's disability on the m other's paid and nonpaid work are mainly descriptive, based on data from small samples of families of disabled children. They do not generally distin guish between genetic and nongenetic conditions. They do suggest, however, that caring for disabled or chronically ill children restricts women's activities outside the home, including employment, while in creasing their domestic burdens (Breslau 1983) . N ot surprisingly, these effects are felt more by low-income and minority women than by others. Breslau has examined the impact of caregiving on a m other's employ ment and household work. A lthough care of disabled children reduces the probability of employment and increases the domestic workload of married women in low-income and black families, the employment probability and household activities of single mothers are not signifi cantly affected (Breslau, Salkever, and Staruch 1982; Breslau 1983) . Single mothers may depend upon their own employment for family income and spend their tim e in nondiscretionary activities that allow little flexibility for allocating additional time to the extra needs of a disabled or chronically ill child (Breslau 1983) . However, married women or women who can rely on the economic assistance of a partner also experience the economic and social costs of giving up paid employment (Wertz and Fletcher 1993) . N or does the burden of caregiving end with the advancing age of children, who in previous times m ight have suc cumbed to their disease before reaching adulthood. Medicine has greatly extended the lives of people w ith disabilities, necessitating the long term involvement of parents in caring for their adult children.
Most research on families w ith disabled or chronically ill children has focused on their disruptive influence on families and marriages (Eiser 1990 ). Many people believe that the presence of a disabled child will strain a marriage. However, divorce rates among parents of disabled children have been reported to be no greater than among parents of nondisabled children (Benson and Gross 1989; Perrin and McLean 1988) . Although the stresses of caring for disabled or ill children may exacer bate existing tensions or problems, some couples have indicated that working together to cope w ith a disabled or chronically ill child has enhanced their marital satisfaction (Benson and Gross 1989) .
It is clear that women continue to serve as the primary caregivers of disabled and chronically ill children and are more likely to experience the burdens and costs associated w ith that task. However, the overall impact of the disabled child on the primary caregiver remains unclear because the methodological design of some studies addressing these issues is flawed, as is apparent in their lack of control groups, unstand ardized measurements, and inadequate control of significant variables like disease severity (Benson and Gross 1989) . More rigorous studies are required in order to characterize adequately the impact of caregiving on women and then to assess whether it meets standards of fairness in society (table 3) . The H G P will not increase the number of disabled children born, and in all probability will reduce their numbers through advances in treatments or selective abortions. Tables 1, 4 , and 5 provide concrete answers to our first and second questions. Regarding questions 3, 4, and 5, however, table 2 indicates only tentative findings about the particular impact of the H G P on women. For the most part, tables 1, 4, and 5 refer to gender differences derived from biological characteristics that are unchangeable; in con trast, most of those mentioned in table 2, which deal w ith differences related to employment, insurance, and caregiving, are changeable. N o conclusions have been reached about the ethical implications of either changeable or unchangeable gender differences. That would re quire a fuller and more theoretical analysis of "justice" and how such differences are to be handled in a "just" society (see, for example, Mahowald 1994 Mahowald , 1995 . Nonetheless, cases where differences confer a greater burden or benefit to women have been noted, suggesting the need for policies to reduce disproportionate burdens and to distribute benefits more equitably. The recent report of the Institute of Medicine's Com mittee on Assessing Genetic Risks (Andrews et al. 1994 ) is a significant contribution in this regard. We believe, however, that adequate devel opment of policies and legislation requires broader public input and greater participation of the groups most affected by the new genetics. A specific focus on women is more than justified by the data provided here.
C onclusion
Clearly, the most im portant set of gender differences as they relate to the H G P involves the increasing availability and use of genetic infor mation for reproductive decisions. Information derived from the HGP will benefit some women by providing them w ith fuller information relevant to reproductive choices. For these women and others, however, the same information is likely to evoke pressures from others and to lead to greater physical risks and psychosocial burdens. Men are unable or less likely to experience most of these consequences of the new genetics. Moreover, unless current practice and politics shift drastically, the ben efits of prenatal diagnosis and interventions will not be available to all women because those in lower-income brackets tend to have less access to these services.
It remains to be seen whether gender differences associated with the new genetics are just or justifiable. The data regarding current dispari ties between women and men, and between different groups of women, do not support the idealistic expectation that the new genetics is likely to be gender neutral in its impact. Yet the same data identify those areas of clinical and social practice that may be targeted now in order to reduce the potential for greater gender disparities in the future.
